Abstract-In this work we pose and solve the problem to guide a collection of weakly interacting dynamical systems e.g., agents, to a specified target distribution. The problem is formulated using the mean-field game theory where each agent seeks to minimize its own cost. The underlying dynamics is assumed to be linear and the cost is assumed to be quadratic. In our framework a terminal cost is added as an incentive term to accomplish the task; we establish that the map between terminal costs and terminal probability distributions is onto. By adding a proper terminal cost/incentive, the agents will reach any desired terminal distribution provided they are adopting the Nash equilibrium strategy. A similar problem is considered in the cooperative game setting where the agents work together to minimize a total cost. Our approach relies on and extends the theory of optimal mass transport and its generalizations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mean-field game (MFG) theory provides a nice approach to study games involving a large number of agents. The basic paradigm requires agents to follow identical dynamics and seek to minimize an individual cost function that is also the same for all. When the number of agents is large, the behavior of the systems can be captured by the empirical distribution of their states. The desire to minimize individual cost drives this empirical distribution. The purpose of this work is to study the control problem to steer the collective response of agents over a finite window of time between two specified end-point marginal distributions by suitable choice of cost (i.e., incentives). Our viewpoint is influenced by recent development of optimal mass transport (OMT) theory that deals with the control and modeling problems of a collective (agents, particles, resources) [1] .
The study of MFG's was introduced into the engineering literature by Huang, Malhamé and Caines [2] and, independently, by Lasry and Lions [3] . Earlier, in the economics literature, similar models were considered by Jovanovic and Rosental [4] . The importance of the subject stems from the wide range of applications that include modeling and control of large-population multi-agent dynamical systems, stock market dynamics, crowd dynamics and more; see [2] [3], [5] , [6] , and also see [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] in the special case of linear dynamics and quadratic cost. On the other hand, OMT originates in the work of Monge [12] and is solved, in the relaxed form, in Kantorovich [13] . In recent years, a fast developing phase was spurred by a wide range of applications of OMT to probability theory, economics, biology and mathematical physics [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] . The connection between OMT [22] and stochastic control has been explored in our work, e.g. [23] , [24] , where the focus has been on regulating uncertainty of stochastically driven dynamical systems by suitable control action. These stochastic control problems, in turn, relate to a classical maximum entropy problem on path space known as the Schrödinger bridge problem, see e.g., [25] , [26] , [27] , [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] .
The goal of the present work is to study density steering problems in an MFG framework. In particular, we are interested in how to design an added terminal cost so as to provide incentives for agents such that under a Nash equilibrium strategy the agents move collectively to a specified target distribution. To this end, we establish that the map between terminal costs and terminal probability distributions is an onto map. Thereby, we develop an MFG-based synthesis framework for OMT-type stochastic control problems.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We study the collective dynamics of a group of agents that interact weakly with each other. The terminology "weakly" refers to the agents being statistically indistinguishable (anonymous) and affecting each other's response only through their empirical distribution [32] . Thus, we consider such a system of N agents with dynamics 1 specified by
Here, x i , u i , w i represent the state, control input, white noise disturbance, respectively, for the ith agent, and the model parameters are the same for all. We further assume that their initial conditions x 1 0 , x 2 0 , . . . , x N 0 are all independent with the same probability density ρ 0 . The ith agent interacts with the rest through the averaged position. The matrices A,Ā ∈ R n×n , B ∈ R n×m are continuous functions of time; for notational simplicity we often use e.g., A instead of A(t). The pair (A, B) is assumed to be controllable in the sense that the reachability Gramian
is invertible for all s < t. Here, Φ(·, ·) denotes the state transition matrix ofẋ = Ax.
In MFG [2] , each agent searches for an optimal control strategy to minimize its own cost
where
is the empirical distribution of the states of the N agents at time t. This is a non-cooperative game and the cost of the ith agent is affected by the strategies of others only through the empirical distribution µ N . An optimal control corresponds to a Nash equilibrium for the game. We follow the arguments in [6] , and restrict ourselves to equilibria that correspond to symmetric Markovian control strategies (state feedback)
When N is large, the empirical distribution µ N is indifferent to small perturbations of control strategy of a single agent. This observation leads to the following approach [6] to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium: fix a family (µ(t)) 0≤t≤1 of probability measures and solve the standard stochastic control problem
denotes the mean 3 of the distribution µ(t), and x 0 is a random vector with probability density ρ 0 . The optimal control is denoted by φ . Treating (µ(t)) 0≤t≤1 as a parameter, the remaining issue is to choose this distribution flow so that the actual distribution of the solution x(t) of (6) with optimal control strategy u (t) = φ (t, x(t))
coincides with µ(t). The solution to the MFG problem involves establishing the existence and uniqueness of the solution to two coupled partial differential equations (PDEs) [6] . It has been shown that a Nash equilibrium point for this mean-field game exists under mild assumptions on the cost function [2] , [3] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] . That is, there exists a family (µ(t)) 0≤t≤1 such that the distribution flow of the solution x(t) of (6) under optimal control strategy φ coincides with this same µ. In addition, this optimal control φ is proven to be an ε-Nash equilibrium to the N -playergame for N large [6] , [33] .
Departing from previous literature, this paper deals with the density steering problem of the N -player-game system. More specifically, we are interested in introducting a suitable cost incentive so that the system is driven to a specific distribution ρ 1 at time t = 1 under (7). In fact, it turns out that under mild conditions, a quadratic running cost in both the control and state (i.e., group linear tracking as in the work of Huang, Malamé and Caines [2] ), can be enhanced by a suitable terminal cost g as follows
so as to acomplish the task of steering the initial distribution to any desired terminal one. In other words, we show that the mapping between a choice of g and the terminal distribution ρ 1 is onto. Formally, the problem we are interested in can be stated as follows.
Problem 1: Given N agents governed by (1) with initial probability density ρ 0 , find a terminal cost g such that, in the Nash equilibrium with cost functional (8) , the agents will reach a given terminal density ρ 1 at time t = 1, in the mean-field game limit.
III. GENERAL APPROACH AND SOLUTION
Without loss of generality and for simplicity of exposition we consider a running cost depending only on the control actuation (i.e., taking the matrix Q in (8) to be zero). We begin with the optimal steering problem [1] , [29] , [30] , [34] without terminal cost. In particular, for a fixed density flow (µ(t)) 0≤t≤1 , we consider the control problem to minimize
subject to the dynamics
x(0) = x 0 ∼ ρ 0 and the constraint that x(1) has probability density ρ 1 . This problem can be posed as
Following a similar argument as in [24] , we establish the following sufficient condition for optimality.
Proposition 1:
If there exist functions ρ , λ satisfying
and boundary conditions
then (ρ , u = B ∇λ) is a solution to (10).
Replacing µ in (11) by ρ we obtain the system of (nonlinear) PDE's ∂λ ∂t
Remark 2: Note that the coupled PDEs (12a-12b) are the same as the PDEs that arise in classic MFG problems corresponding to (1) and (8) . However, the usual boundary conditions
are now different and given by (12c). Evidently, the Lagrange multiplier −λ is the value (cost-to-go) function of the associated optimal control problem.
It can be shown that (12) has a solution under the assumption that the "coupled" Gramian
is invertible, whereΦ is the state transition matrices for the pair (A+Ā, B). The proof relies on the standard Schrödinger bridge theory [23] , [24] and can be found in [35] .
Finally, back to Problem 1, we assert that with terminal cost
we can guide the agents to have terminal distribution ρ 1 . To this extent, we follow the strategy in [6] as mentioned in Section II. First fix µ = ρ with ρ being the solution to (12) , and then solve the optimal control problem (5). Since g(x, ρ (1, ·)) = g(x, ρ 1 ) = −λ(1, x), we have
Hence, the unique optimal control strategy is u (t) = B ∇λ(t, x(t)). It follows from (12) that the probability distribution of the controlled state x(t) is ρ . Therefore, with terminal cost g as in (14) we are able to steer the system to terminal distribution ρ 1 . Thus, we have established the following result.
Theorem 3: Consider N agents governed by (1) with initial density ρ 0 . Suppose the terminal cost in (8) is as in (14) . Then, in the Nash equilibrium, the agents will reach density ρ 1 at time t = 1, in the mean-field game limit.
Remark 4:
The above results resemble the that of OMT problems, which impart an optimal to connect two marginal distributions. Indeed, when the interaction term is 0, our problem becomes a stochastic control formulation of OMT.
IV. GAUSSIAN CASE
In case when ρ 0 and ρ 1 are normal (Gaussian) distributions, the solutions have a nice linear structure. Let the two marginal distributions be
i.e., Gaussian distributions with, respectively, means m 0 , m 1 and covariances Σ 0 , Σ 1 . The solution of (12) has the form
where m(t) = Φ(1, t) M −1 10 (m 1 −Φ 10 m 0 ), y(t) is the solution tȯ y(t) = (A +Ā)y(t) + BB m(t), y(0) = m 0 , and
Recall the definition ofM 10 andΦ 10 in (13).
The expressionλ in (15) equalŝ
where Π(t) is the solution to the Riccati equatioṅ
with boundary condition
where 0) . And so, in view of (14) , one choice of terminal cost is
In the above we have discarded some constant terms −λ(1, x) as it doesn't affect the final result.
Theorem 5: Consider N agents governed by (1) with initial density ρ 0 ∼ N [m 0 , Σ 0 ]. Suppose the terminal cost in (8) is (17) . Then, in the Nash equilibrium, the agents will reach density ρ 1 ∼ N [m 1 , Σ 1 ] at time t = 1, in the meanfield game limit.
V. COOPERATIVE GAME
We next shift to a slightly different problem. Given the same interacting agents' system (1), we would like to investigate the density steering problem in the cooperative game setting. How to select an optimal controller to drive the agents from given initial distribution ρ 0 to terminal distribution ρ 1 ? Again, we restrict ourself to equilibria given by symmetric Markovian strategies in closed-loop feedback form
The cost function we attempt to minimize is the average control energy
We are interested in the mean-field limit, namely, the asymptotical behavior of the solution when N → ∞.
Problem 6: Given N agents governed by (1) with initial density ρ 0 , find a control strategy (18) with minimum control energy (19) so that the agents will reach density ρ 1 at time t = 1, as N goes to ∞.
The major difference between this problem and the mean-field game is that all the agents always use the same control strategy. A small perturbation on the control will affect the probability density flow as the perturbation is applied to the controllers of all the agents, see [6] , [37] for more discussions on their differences. The average control energy (19) is equivalent to relative entropy of the controller system with respect to the uncontrolled system [38] , [39] , [32] . Therefore, the above problem can also be viewed as an Schrödinger bridge problem for interacting particle systems.
Problem 6 can be formulated as an optimal control problem over the McKean-Vlasov model dx(t) = Ax(t)dt +Āx(t)dt + Bu(t)dt + Bdw(t),
It has the following fluid dynamic formulation. Let ρ(t, ·) be the probability density of the controlled process x(t), then the optimal control problem can be stated as
Proposition 2: If there exists (λ, ρ ) satisfying
with boundary conditions
then (ρ , u = B ∇λ) is a solution to (21) .
Equations (22) are highly coupled. In general, one may not expect a solution to exist. But interestingly, it can be shown that (22) always has a solution, under the assumption that the pair (A +Ā, B) is controllable. The proof that this pair (ρ , u ) provides a solution to the optimal control problem (21) can be found in [35] .
Remark 7:
The sufficient condition, the pair (A+Ā, B) is controllable, that (22) has a solution is different to that of (12) , which is the "coupled" Gramian (13) being invertible.
VI. EXAMPLES
Consider N agents with dynamics
The two marginal distributions ρ 0 and ρ 1 are two normal distributions
A. Noncooperative game
One choice of terminal cost that will steer the agents from ρ 0 to ρ 1 is g(x, µ) = 0.9805(x −x µ ) 2 + 4.3679x. Figure 1 showcases the evolution of the probability density in the Nash equilibrium. To show that the distribution of the agents would evolve according to Figure 1 , we simulated the dynamics for a system with N = 20000 agents under the optimal strategy. Figure 2 and Figure 3 depict the empirical distributions of the particles at time t = 0 and t = 1. They match with the theoretical distributions ρ 0 and ρ 1 very well. B. Cooperative game Figure 4 depicts the time evolution of the probability densities with these two marginal distributions in the cooperative game setting. Similarly, we ran some simulations for a particle system with N = 20000 and obtained Figure 5 and Figure 6 as the empirical distributions of the agents at time t = 0 and t = 1.
VII. CONCLUSION
We introduce a paradigm to steer a large number of agents from one distribution to another. The problem lies in the intersection of MFG, OMT and optimal control. We study such problems for linearly weakly interacting agents under 0) quadratic running cost. Results for the cooperative game counterpart are also presented. We expect this paradigm to bring in a new dimension to the study of MFG and OMT and to be useful in social science such as economics.
